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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance of labor market institutions for in-
￿ ation and unemployment dynamics. Using the New Keynesian framework
we argue that labor market institutions should be divided into those insti-
tutions that cause Unemployment Rigidities (UR) and those that cause Real
Wage Rigidities (RWR). The two types of institutions have opposite e⁄ects
and their interaction is crucial for the dynamics of in￿ ation and unemploy-
ment. We estimate a panel VAR with deterministically varying coe¢ cients
and ￿nd that there is a profound di⁄erence in the responses of unemployment
and in￿ ation to shocks under di⁄erent constellations of the labor market.
Keywords: Labor Market Search, Real Wage Rigidity, Unemployment, Business
Cycle, Monetary Policy
JEL Classi￿cation: E32, E24, E52
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Non Technical Summary
Understanding the working of labor markets is crucial to understand in￿ a-
tion and unemployment dynamics. Over recent years, many voices have risen
to advocate reforms to make labor markets more ￿ exible. The conventional
view among policy makers is that more ￿ exible labor markets are needed to im-
prove the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy. Moreover, ￿ exible labor markets are
believed to be important to facilitate the e¢ cient adjustment of the economy
to sectoral shifts and economic changes. However, most of these voices do not
specify what labor market ￿ exibility actually means. The aim of this paper is to
shed some light, both theoretically and empirically, on three related issues: (1)
Are labor market institutions really important for in￿ ation and unemployment
dynamics and, if yes, how? (2) What does labor market ￿ exibility mean? (3)
How important are interactions among di⁄erent labor market institutions?
Recent theoretical articles have started to incorporate labor markets in the
DSGE framework. The ￿ndings from these models have enhanced our under-
standing of unemployment and in￿ ation dynamics and improved in various as-
pects the ￿t with the data. But studies on the empirical link are still scarce
and most authors calibrate the labor market to assess the ￿t of their proposed
model. With this paper we provide a ￿rst attempt to use data on actual labor
institutions to analyze their role for dynamic adjustments of in￿ ation and un-
employment in a cross country comparison. We analyze the response to external
shocks and evaluate to which extent monetary policy e⁄ectiveness is a⁄ected by
the constellation of the labor market. To conduct the analysis we ￿rst derive
a simple DSGE model to describe the theoretical predictions of the di⁄erent
labor market rigidities in the model. What truly matters for the adjustment is
whether the institutions constrain the adjustment of prices or the ￿ ows in and
out of employment. While the former aspect is introduced via real wage rigidi-
ties the latter comes from search and matching for labor, where it is costly to
hire new workers. The ￿ndings from the model imply that the starkest contrast
in the response of in￿ ation and unemployment to shocks is observed when the
two types of labor market institutions are substitutes, while the responses are
more alike if both institutions are either rigid or ￿ exible.
The insights from the model are taken directly to the data and are tested
on a sample of OECD countries. We estimate a panel VAR which includes,
next to unemployment and in￿ ation, the interest rate as a measure of monetary
policy and two global shocks: the oil price and an external demand shifter.
To incorporate the role of the labor market the coe¢ cients are allowed to vary
deterministically with indicators of the two dimensions of the labor market by
using interaction terms. In line with the model there is a signi￿cantly di⁄erent
response of in￿ ation and unemployment to the two external shocks. In the
economy with rigid labor and ￿ exible wages in￿ ation increases by twice the
amount in response to an oil shock compared to the economy with ￿ exible labor
and rigid wages. On the other hand unemployment hardly reacts in the latter
case while it increases signi￿cantly in the case with ￿ exible labor and rigid
wages. For a drop in external demand a similar picture emerges.1 Introduction
Understanding the working of labor markets is crucial to understand in￿ ation and
unemployment dynamics. Over recent years, many voices have risen to advocate
reforms to make labor markets more ￿ exible. The conventional view among policy
makers is that more ￿ exible labor markets are needed in order to "improve the e⁄ec-
tiveness of monetary policy by facilitating price stability" (Trichet, 2007)1. Moreover,
￿ exible labor markets are believed to be important to facilitate the e¢ cient adjust-
ment of the economy to sectoral shifts and economic changes. Indeed, the perceived
wisdom in European policy circles is that there is a ￿need for more ￿ exible labour
markets in the context of the EU, particularly at the national and regional levels￿ .2
However, most of these voices do not specify what labor market ￿ exibility actually
means.
The aim of this paper is to shed some light, both theoretically and empirically, on
three related issues: (1) Are labor market institutions really important for in￿ ation
and unemployment dynamics and, if yes, how? (2) What does labor market ￿ exibility
mean? (3) How important are interactions among di⁄erent labor market institutions?
Our paper is related to a rapidly growing body of literature that has started to
investigate, in the context of New Keynesian models, the scope and importance of
labor market rigidities for unemployment and in￿ ation dynamics.3 While most of
the authors ￿nd a strong e⁄ect of labor market institutions (LMI) on unemployment
￿ uctuations, there is less agreement regarding the e⁄ect of LMI on in￿ ation dynamics.
On the one side, Campolmi and Faia (2008) claim that labor market institutions
matter, and in particular that di⁄erences in the generosity of unemployment bene￿ts
can partly explain in￿ ation volatility di⁄erentials among euro area countries. On
the other side, Thomas and Zanetti (2009) argue that the e⁄ect of labor market
reforms (lower bene￿ts and/or ￿ring costs) on in￿ ation dynamics is likely to be small.
In the middle, Christo⁄el, Kuester and Linzert (2009) argue that only institutions
that a⁄ect directly wage dynamics have a non-negligible e⁄ect on in￿ ation. More
speci￿cally, they ￿nd that while a reduction in the degree of nominal wage stickiness
would make monetary policy more e⁄ective, the importance of other labor market
rigidities (hiring costs, unemployment bene￿ts, workers￿bargaining power) is rather
1"The implementation of the reforms of the Lisbon agenda, by easing labour and product rigidi-
ties [...] will also improve the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy by facilitating price stability." (Jean
Monnet Lecture to the Lisbon Agenda, 4 June 2007)
2ECB Monthly Bullettin, May 2005, p. 71.
3See, e.g., Trigari (2009), Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007), Blanchard and Gal￿ (2009)
and Thomas and Zanetti (2009).
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A discrepancy thus appears between the policy-makers perception that LMI are
important for in￿ ation dynamics and most recent academic research, who ￿nd the
e⁄ect of LMI on in￿ ation dynamics to be rather limited. The claim of our paper is
threefold:
First, we claim that labor market institutions can be divided into two groups:
Unemployment Rigidities (UR) which capture the institutions - like employment
protection legislation, hiring costs and the matching technology - that limit the ￿ ows
in and out of unemployment; and Real Wage Rigidities (RWR), intended to capture
all the institutions - including wage indexation and the wage bargaining mechanism
and legislation - which in￿ uence the responsiveness of real wages to economic activity.
Distinguishing the two types of rigidities is crucial since we show they have opposite
dynamic e⁄ects. When the degree of unemployment rigidities is higher in￿ ation
volatility increases and the responses of the real economy to shocks is dampened.
A higher degree of real wage rigidity ampli￿es the response of the real economy to
shocks and reduces the volatility of in￿ ation. This is a very intuitive result, since
(loosely speaking) in the ￿rst case, the rigidity is in ￿labor quantities￿ , while in the
second case it is ￿labor prices￿that cannot adjust.
Second, we show that what really matters for the dynamics of in￿ ation and un-
employment is the interaction among the two types of institutions.5 Since UR and
RWR have opposite dynamic e⁄ects, it is crucial to determine whether di⁄erent
labor market institutions are complements or substitutes. If UR and RWR are com-
plements, in the sense that countries with rigid wages are the ones with rigid labor
and countries that have ￿ exible wages also have ￿ exible labor, their e⁄ects tend to
o⁄set each other. If UR and RWR are substitutes, in the sense that countries with
rigid wages have ￿ exible labor or vice versa, the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of rigidities
reinforce and magnify each other. This implies that the slope of the Phillips curve in
a country with both ￿ exible wages and ￿ exible labor (like the US) can be very similar
to the one of countries with both rigid wages and rigid labor (like Spain or Belgium).
In other words, looking separately at one institution can be highly misleading.
Third, we argue that these e⁄ects are quantitatively relevant not only for unem-
ployment but also for in￿ ation dynamics. To support this claim, in the second part
4The empirical strategy of this paper di⁄ers from Thomas and Zanetti (2009) and Christo⁄ell
et al. (2009) because we adopt a cross-country perspective. Both Thomas and Zanetti (2009) and
Christo⁄ell et al. (2009) results are based on models that are partially calibrated and partially
estimated. Importantly, in both cases most labor market parameters are calibrated.
5A similar point, in a di⁄erent context, has been put forward by Bertola and Rogerson (1997).
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in the model and we provide support to our claims using two di⁄erent econometric
strategies. First, we estimate a panel model with time-varying volatility measures
for six sub-periods. Then we estimate a panel VAR using a technique that allows
to control for the impact of di⁄erent labor market institutions. We ￿nd that the
model￿ s predictions are con￿rmed quite well by the data, which covers a sample of
OECD countries from 1970-1999, and that once the interaction among di⁄erent labor
market institutions is taken into account, the structure of labor markets matter not
only for unemployment but also for in￿ ation dynamics.
We believe that our ￿ndings carry strong policy implications, both with respect
to the conduct of monetary policy and with respect to the e⁄ects of labor market
reforms. Using two examples, we ￿rst show that it is not necessarily true that more
￿ exible labor markets improve the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy: monetary policy
actually becomes less e⁄ective in lowering in￿ ation if the degree of unemployment
rigidities gets lower. In the second example we show that labor market reforms may
have very di⁄erent e⁄ects depending on whether they reduce hiring and ￿ring costs
or wage frictions: while lower RWR make macroeconomic stabilization easier, lower
UR make it more di¢ cult.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the model,
which consists in a relatively simple New Keynesian model with search and matching
in the labor market. As a modelling strategy, we explicitly build the simplest possible
model that can convey the intuition behind our results, which we consider to be more
general and to hold in a wider class of models. The baseline calibration is described
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the moments of the simulated model under di⁄erent
calibrations of the labor market. In Section 5 we draw some policy implications for
the design of monetary policy under varying labor market constellations. Section 6
confronts these results to the data of a range of OECD countries. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
2 The model economy
In order to show the basic intuition behind our results, we build a simple new Keyne-
sian model which combines nominal rigidities with search and matching in the labor
market and allows for the presence of real wage rigidities. Additionally, we introduce
oil in the model as a channel for an external supply shock. The model consists of
four building blocks: the households, the intermediate goods ￿rms, the retail ￿rms
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2.1 Households
Each household is thought of as a very large extended family with names on the unit
interval. The representative household maximizes a standard lifetime utility, which





s [log(Ct+s) ￿ {Nt+s] (1)







where Cm;t denotes consumption of imported oil, Cx;t is a CES index of domestic
goods with elasticity of substitution " and ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿c
c (1 ￿ ￿c)
￿(1￿￿c). Nt denotes
employment.




























is the price index of domestic goods, Pm;t is
the price of oil in domestic currency and Pc;t the CPI. Wt is the nominal wage; QB
t is
the price of a one period domestic bond, paying one unit of domestic currency and
Bt is the quantity of the bond purchased in period t. Dt denotes the family share
of aggregate pro￿ts from retailers and matched ￿rms, net of government lump-sum
taxes. For simplicity, we assume no access to international ￿nancial markets.
The optimal allocation of consumption between domestic and imported goods
implies a constant expenditure share, with ￿c re￿ ecting the share of oil in consump-
tion. If we denote by St the real price of oil in term of domestic goods, St =
Pm;t
Px;t ,
we can express the CPI as Pc;t = Px;tS
￿c
t .
Conditional on an optimal allocation between the two goods, consumption max-
imization leads to the standard Euler condition:
6To avoid distributional issues we assume that consumption is pooled inside the family.
7The introduction of oil in the model follows Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008).
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There are two sectors of production in the economy. Competitive ￿rms in the whole-
sale sector produce the intermediate homogeneous good using labor and oil as inputs.
The output is sold to retailers who are monopolistic competitive. Retailers trans-
f orm the homogeneous goods one for one into di⁄erentiated goods at no cost. Price
rigidities, in the form of Calvo (1983) price staggering, arise in the retail sector, while
search and matching frictions arise in the wholesale sector.
2.2.1 The wholesale sector
The number of newly formed ￿rm￿ worker matches in the labor market, mt, depends
on the measure of vacancies vt and job seekers st according to a constant return to
scale matching technology:





where ￿ m is a scalar re￿ ecting the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The fraction
of searching workers is given by:
st = 1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Nt￿1 (4)
where the labor force is normalized to unity. The separation rate ￿ represents the
f raction of the employed that each period lose their jobs and join the unemployment
pool.







where ￿t = vt
st denotes the labor market tightness. The probability that a worker





Each ￿rm in the intermediate good sector produces the domestic good according
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where At is an exogenous productivity process and Ot is the quantity of imported




Px;t in terms of the domestic good.
The cost of posting a vacancy is ￿t = ￿
￿t, where ￿ is the utility cost from search
services and ￿
￿t the corresponding cost in terms of the consumption good. Employ-
ment evolves according to the law of motion:
Nt = (1 ￿ ￿)Nt￿1 + qtvt (5)
For future reference, we also de￿ne (after-hiring) unemployment as the fraction
of searching workers that remain unemployed after hiring takes place, ut = 1 ￿ Nt.





















where ￿t;t+1 = ￿ Ct
Ct+1 is the stochastic discount factor, mplt = (1 ￿ ￿p) Xt
Nt is the
marginal product of labor and wR
t ￿ Wt
Pc;t is the real wage in terms of the consumption
goods. Eq. (6) is the job creation condition, which equates the costs of posting
a vacancy to the expected payo⁄s from an employment relationship. The latter
depends on real revenue minus the real wage, and includes the continuation value
represented by the saving in next period￿ s expected hiring costs. Eq. (7) is the ￿rm￿ s
demand for imported oil.
2.2.2 Wage determination
Wages are determined in a framework of decentralized Nash bargaining. Let V E
t ￿V U
t
be the value of an employment relationship for the household in period t. The net
value of employment (V E
t ) as opposed to unemployment (V U
t ) is the real wage net
of the disutility of work, plus the discounted continuation value:
8Since all wholesale ￿rms are equal in equilibrium we avoid ￿rm speci￿c￿ s subscripts.
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On the other side, the value of an employment relationship for a ￿rm is, in units of
consumption goods, Jt = ￿t
qt.
A realized job match yields a rent equal to the sum of the expected search costs
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Intuitively, the Nash wage depends on two parts: a relatively stable one, the
reservation wage RESt (here given by the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption, {
￿t), and a more volatile one, the ￿wage premium￿PREt,
which depends on the size of the rents for existing employment relationships and on
the workers￿relative bargaining power (the last two terms).
2.2.3 Introducing real wage rigidities
Following much of the literature, we formalize real wage rigidity by employing a
version of Hall￿ s (2005) notion of a wage norm.9 A wage norm may arise as a result
of social conventions that constrain wage adjustment for existing and newly hired
workers. One way to model this is to assume that the real wage wR
t is a weighted
average of the desired wage (the Nash bargained wage wNash
t ) and a wage norm ￿ w,
which is simply assumed to be the wage prevailing in steady state. Speci￿cally, the
9As ￿rst noted by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), the introduction of real wage rigidities con-
siderably improves the performance of search and matching models in terms of the dynamics of
the labor market. This issue is especially important for the euro area, which is characterized by a
considerable degree of wage rigidity. See e.g. Dickens et al. (2007) and Du Caju et al. (2008) for
some evidence on nominal and real wage rigidity in the euro area.
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where ￿ is an index of the real wage rigidities present in the economy, with
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. As shown by Hall (2005), this rule falls inside the bargaining set and
thus remains robust to the Barro (1977) critique.
2.2.4 Final good sector
There is a measure one of monopolistic retailers indexed by z on the unit interval,
each of them producing one di⁄erentiated consumption good. Due to imperfect








Firms in the retail sector purchase intermediate goods from wholesale producers
at price ’t and convert it into a di⁄erentiated ￿nal good sold to households and to
the government authority. Retailers share the same technology which transform one
unit of wholesale good into one unit of retail good, Xt (z) = Yt(z). The relative price
of the intermediate good ’t represents the marginal cost for the ￿nal good producer,
which can be rewritten as:















Notice that labor market institutions a⁄ect the evolution of marginal costs both
directly, through their e⁄ect on marginal hiring costs
￿
￿t





indirectly, through the evolution of real wages wR
t .
We introduce nominal price rigidity using the formalism ￿ la Calvo (1983). Each
period, ￿rms may reset their prices with a probability 1 ￿ &. Log-linearizing around
a zero in￿ ation steady state we obtain a standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
^ ￿x;t = ￿Et^ ￿x;t+1 + ￿p^ ’t (11)
10In a previous version of this paper we have considered a real wage rule where the wage norm









Even though the latter rule gives richer dynamics, similar results and the same intuition apply.
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^ ’t represents the log deviation of real marginal costs from the steady state value,
which can be expressed as
^ ’t = h0 ^ w
R
t + (1 ￿ h0)^ ct ￿ d mplt + ￿c ^ St + h1
h
^ ￿t ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)^ ￿t+1
i
where h0 = wRS￿c





In an equilibrium with balanced trade (and hence Bt = 0) we must have that
Pc;tCt + Pc;tGt = Px;tYt ￿ Pm;tOt






= [1 ￿ ￿p’t]Px;tYt
where we make use of the demand for oil in production Ot = ￿p’t
Yt
St. Gt denotes
government spending, which by assumption is homogenous with the consumption
good. Dividing both sides by Pc;t, we get the aggregate resource constraint
Ct + Gt = [1 ￿ ￿p’t]YtS
￿￿c
t
where, as in Krause and Lubik (2007), the costs of vacancy posting are assumed
to be distributed across households.
2.4 Fiscal and monetary policy
The ￿scal authority is assumed to adjust lump-sum taxes, Tt, to balance its budget in
every period. The law of motion for government spending follows an autoregressive





log ￿ G + ￿g logGt￿1 + "
g
t
where ￿g < 1 and "
g
t is an i.i.d. government spending shock.
The central bank sets the short term nominal interest rate by reacting to a
measure of core CPI in￿ ation, according to the following monetary policy rule (here
14
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^ {t = ￿m^ {t￿1 + ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿m) ^ ￿x;t + "
m
t
where ￿m captures the degree of interest rate smoothing, ￿￿ > 1is the response
coe¢ cient of in￿ ation and "m
t is an i.i.d monetary policy shock.
3 Calibration
Before proceeding, some details on the calibration strategy are needed. We want to
distinguish between two key dimensions of the labor market: Unemployment Rigidi-
ties (UR), which capture the institutions - such as employment protection legislation,
hiring costs and the matching technology - that limit the ￿ ows in and out of unem-
ployment; and Real Wage Rigidities (RWR), intended to capture all the institutions
- including wage indexation and the wage bargaining mechanism and legislation -
which in￿ uence the responsiveness of real wages to economic activity.
To study the role of di⁄erent degrees of RWR is straightforward. We simulate
the model varying the index of RWR (￿) from 0 to 0:9. Calibrating the degree of
UR is a more challenging task, as the overall degree of ￿rigidity￿in the labor market
does not depend only on one parameter but on the entire con￿guration of the labor
market. Following Blanchard and Gal￿ (2009), we de￿ne labor as ￿￿ exible￿when the
job-￿nding rate and the separation rate are high; the opposite holds if labor is rigid.
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the parameters implied by this calibration strategy.
As our UR index increases from 0 to 1 the job-￿nding rate decreases from 0:7 to 0:25
and the separation rate decreases from 0:12 to 0:04. The implied unemployment rate
increases from 0:05 to 0:10.11 Notice that this way of capturing the degree of URs
is consistent with the ￿ndings of Elsby et al. (2008) that out￿ ow and in￿ ow rates
from unemployment are much higher in Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries than in
Continental Europe.
The calibration of the remaining parameters is fairly standard. Time is taken as
quarters. The discount factor ￿ is set equal to 0:992. The elasticity of substitution
between di⁄erentiated goods " is set equal to 6, corresponding to a markup ￿ = 1:2.
The steady state level of productivity A and the relative price of oil S are normalized
to 1. For the elasticity of the matching function, we adopt the standard value of
11Notice that the two extremes of our UR index correspond to the "EU calibration" and to
the "US calibration" in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2009). Notice also that total hiring costs in steady
state are kept constant to 1 percent of steady state GDP. This implies that marginal hiring costs
are higher in economies with low hiring rates (i.e. high UR), which is consistent with a view of
"sclerotic" economies characterized by institutional constraints on the hiring process.
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￿ = 0:5. As in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008), we set the share of oil in consumption and
in production respectively to ￿c = 0:012 and ￿p = 0:017. The share of government
consumption is assumed to be 20 percent of GDP, as in Thomas and Zanetti (2009).
In the baseline calibration, designed to capture the euro area in 2005, we set
unemployment to be u = 0:08. The job-￿nding rate p is set to 0:4, which corresponds
approximately to a monthly rate of 0:15. Given u and p, it is possible to determine
the separation rate using the relation ￿ = up=((1 ￿ u)(1 ￿ p)). We obtain a value
￿ = 0:058. The vacancy ￿lling rate q is set to 0:8. The workers￿relative bargaining
power ￿ is set to 0:5, as standard in the literature. The vacancy cost parameter ￿ is
chosen such that hiring costs represent a 1 percent fraction of steady state output.
The parameter { on disutility of labor is determined using steady state relations.
The degree of price rigidity ￿ is set equal to 0:75, implying an average duration
of price contracts of one year. In the baseline calibration, we set the degree of real
wage rigidity to ￿ = 0:5, as in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2009).
Regarding monetary policy, we assume the central bank reacts to in￿ ation with
an elasticity ￿￿ = 1:5 and a persistence in interest rates ￿m = 0:9.12
There are four shocks in the model: the productivity shock, the oil shock, the
demand/government shock and the monetary policy shock. The standard deviation
of the monetary shock is set to ￿" = 0:0015. The persistence of the oil price shock
is set to ￿o = 0:95 while its standard deviation is calibrated to ￿o = 0:16, as in
Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008). Following Christo⁄el et al. (2009), we set the persistence
and the standard deviation of government shocks to ￿g = 0:8 and ￿g = 0:005.
12See, e.g, Clarida et al. (2000).
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the standard values ￿a = 0:9 and ￿a = 0:006.
4 Labor market institutions and the cycle
Business cycle characteristics depend primarily on three elements: the structure of
the economy, the shocks experienced by the economy and the policy followed by the
central bank (see, e.g., Stock and Watson, 2003, for a discussion). Recent research
has mainly focused on the last two elements and on their role in contributing to
decreased macroeconomic volatility.13 Here we focus instead on the structure of the
economies and analyze how di⁄erent labor market institutions a⁄ect business cycle
characteristics. To this aim, we simulate the model keeping the shock processes and
the monetary policy rule ￿xed, and vary only the labor market structure, as captured
by the RWR and the UR indices. We ￿rst look at the e⁄ect of one type of rigidity in
isolation, and then we study the interactions between the two types of labor market
rigidities.
4.1 The separate role of UR and RWR for macroeconomic
stability
Fig. 2 shows how di⁄erent degrees of UR (left column) and RWR (right column)
a⁄ect the volatility of key macroeconomic variables. We simulate the model for
di⁄erent calibrations of the labor market and show the standard deviation of the
hp-￿ltered time series of the macroeconomic variables. The volatility of in￿ ation
refers to the quarterly volatility of the cpi in￿ ation rate (non annualized). In order
to interpret the volatility of unemployment and vacancies, notice that ^ ut and ^ vt are
de￿ned as the deviations of unemployment and vacancies from steady state, i.e. as
^ ut ￿ ut ￿ ￿ u and ^ vt = vt ￿ ￿ v (and thus the results are not in￿ uenced by the fact that
the steady state levels of unemployment and vacancies di⁄er across calibrations).14
A higher degree of UR reduces the volatility of unemployment and vacancies but
increases the volatility of marginal costs, real wages and in￿ ation. When job-￿nding
and separation rates are lower employment adjusts less easily to changing labor mar-
13See, among others, Stock and Watson (2003) and Gal￿ and Gambetti (2009) for two competing
views.
14Notice that when we compute the volatility of vacancies in terms of log deviations from steady
state, we get a value that ranges between 11:95 and 24:56. These numbers are roughly consistent
with Shimer￿ s (2005) results.
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ket conditions. This in turn implies that marginal costs and hence in￿ ation become
more sensitive to unemployment changes.15 As a consequence, the volatility trade-






, is strongly increasing in the degree of unemployment rigidities.
A higher degree of RWR, on the contrary, limits wage adjustments and creates
incentives for ￿rms to absorb shocks using the hiring margin: as in Hall (2005), when
real wages are rigid, the ￿rms￿share of the match surplus change strongly with shocks
and hence hiring and unemployment react strongly to changing economic conditions.
This lowers the sensitivity of marginal costs and in￿ ation to unemployment changes
and tends to amplify the response of the real economy to shocks. RWR thus reduce
the volatility of marginal costs and in￿ ation and increase the volatility of unemploy-
ment and real variables. As a consequence, the volatility trade-o⁄ is decreasing in
the degree of RWR.
The preceding analysis establishes from a theoretical point of view our ￿rst claim.
15See Ravenna and Walsh (2008) for a similar argument.
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discussions (and often labeled under the same category of labor market rigidities)
are likely to have opposite e⁄ects on business cycle ￿ uctuations. It does make a
di⁄erence whether the rigidity lies in the wage determination mechanism or in the
￿ ows in and out of unemployment. This is a very intuitive result, since (loosely
speaking) in the ￿rst case the rigidity is in ￿labor prices￿ , while in the second it is
￿labor quantities￿that cannot adjust.
4.2 The importance of labor market interactions
Another important question arises naturally from the analysis: how do di⁄erent
labor market rigidities interact? Are interaction e⁄ects likely to be important or
negligible?
Fig. 3 shows how the volatility trade-o⁄, i.e. the ratio between the volatility
of in￿ ation and the volatility of unemployment, change for di⁄erent combinations
of real wage rigidities and unemployment rigidities. Notice that the trade-o⁄ has
a nice economic interpretation, as it is related to the slope of the Phillips Curve
and represents how much in￿ ation volatility needs to be a⁄orded in order to reduce
the volatility of unemployment by one percent. The shape of the trade-o⁄ conveys
that though looking at the e⁄ect of one type of rigidity while maintaining the other
constant is informative, it can be misleading, as it ignores the existence of important
interactions between the institutions.
If UR and RWR are complements, in the sense that countries with rigid wages
are the ones with rigid labor and countries that have ￿ exible wages also have ￿ exible
labor, the e⁄ects of RWR and UR tend to o⁄set each other. This has very important
implications, since it implies that countries like the US that have relatively ￿ exible
wages and labor may have the same slope of the Phillips curve than countries like
Belgium or Spain that have both rigid wages and sclerotic labor.16
If UR and RWR are substitutes, in the sense that countries with rigid wages have
￿ exible labor or vice versa, the e⁄ects of di⁄erent types of rigidities on the trade-o⁄
tend to reinforce and magnify each other. The volatility trade-o⁄is at its maximum
in a country with very rigid labor and ￿ exible wages (the north corner) as both
elements induce ￿rms to prefer changes in prices rather than changes in quantities.
16See Bertola and Rogerson (1997) for a similar argument. Notice that the Blanchard and Gal￿
(2009) de￿nition of a "sclerotic" labor market refers to turnover ￿ ows, and the Bertola and Rogerson
(1997) mechanism and results were indeed based on the complementarity between ￿ ows restrictions
and wage setting institutions leading to wage compression.
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Figure 3: The Importance of Labor Market Interactions
It is at its minimum in countries where real wages are rigid and unemployment
rigidities are low (the south corner). Notice that even for a reasonable calibration,
the e⁄ects are strong and non-linear.
Are UR and RWR likely to be complements or substitutes? A priori, there is
no clear-cut answer, as good theoretical arguments can be found that go in both
directions.17 The ￿nal answer is empirical, and we defer to the second part of the
paper for a discussion of the available evidence.
5 Policy implications
Our analysis has shown that there is a pronounced di⁄erence between labor market
institutions and the way they a⁄ect macroeconomic dynamics. Naturally these dif-
17For instance, a strict employment protection legislation (a source of UR) and a generous unem-
ployment bene￿t system (a source of RWR) can arguably be considered as substitutes: anectodical
evidence suggests that countries with weak public ￿nance may ￿nd it di¢ cult to put in place an
e¢ cient unemployment bene￿t system and may therefore opt for ￿ring costs as a way to defend
the workers from transitory shocks. On the other side, the presence of hiring/￿ring costs may be
considered as complement of the insider/outsider problem: hiring and ￿ring costs, in fact, increase
the rents linked to an employment relationship and thus the insiders￿power. If wages are set by
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the "￿ exible is good, rigid is bad" dichotomy. In the following we present two exam-
ples, studying ￿rst the impact of oil price and monetary policy shocks and then the
e⁄ects of labor market reforms.
5.1 Does labor market ￿ exibility make monetary policy more
e⁄ective?
Policy makers often advocate labor market reforms on the ground that a more ￿ ex-
ible labor market improves the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy and facilitates price
stability. Is this necessarily true? To investigate this point we consider three dif-
ferent types of labor market constellations and compare the e⁄ect on in￿ ation and
unemployment of an increase in the nominal interest rate by one standard deviation.
The values of the parameters for the labor market which we use in this exercise are
summarized in the following table:
Baseline High Low
RWR ￿ = 0:5 ￿ = 0:65 ￿ = 0:35
UR p = 0:4;￿ = 0:06 p = 0:25;￿ = 0:04 p = 0:7;￿ = 0:12
Consider the two panels on the left of Figure 4, which show the response of
in￿ ation and unemployment when we vary the degree of RWR or UR while keeping
the other ￿xed. Suppose ￿rst the government is able to pass a reform that reduces
the degree of RWR. Following a monetary policy shock, in￿ ation would react slightly
more and unemployment less. Monetary policy would indeed be more e⁄ective in
lowering in￿ ation, but the e⁄ect, under our calibration, would be very small.
Suppose instead the government is able to pass a reform that facilitates the ￿ ows
in and out of unemployment. In￿ ation reacts less and unemployment more when UR
are low. Monetary policy, contrary to the conventional wisdom, would become less
e⁄ective in lowering in￿ ation and the central bank should become more aggressive
to reach the target.
The two panels on the right demonstrate the e⁄ect of labor market interactions,
by showing what happens when labor markets are substitutes (that is, when low
RWR are combined with high UR or viceversa). The impact of the same shock is
magni￿ed when labor market institutions are substitutes. On impact, in￿ ation reacts
almost three times more when RWR are low and UR are high than when UR are low
and RWR are high; the opposite holds for unemployment. On the contrary, it can be
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the di⁄erences in the impulse responses get small. Hence, a move from an overall rigid
labor market to an overall ￿ exible market may have little impact on the e⁄ectiveness
of monetary policy.
This intuition is con￿rmed when we analyze the e⁄ect of other shocks. Consider
the e⁄ect of an oil price increase (Fig. 5). Again, only once we consider the interac-
tion between the two types of institutions the di⁄erence in responses becomes large
and signi￿cant (in particular for in￿ ation). This may explain why many studies ￿nd
no or little role of labor market institutions for in￿ ation dynamics, when looking at
one dimension in isolation.
To determine the e⁄ect of shocks on in￿ ation and unemployment dynamics it is
thus crucial to determine whether institutions are substitutes or complements. This
becomes particularly evident in the context of a monetary union. When countries
within a union exhibit heterogeneous labor markets, the propagation mechanisms of
shocks are likely to di⁄er across member countries. Only when labor market institu-
tions are substitutes, symmetric shocks (and thus monetary policy) will have strong
asymmetric e⁄ects and thus lead to large, ine¢ cient, in￿ ation and unemployment
di⁄erentials. The common central bank will ￿nd it optimal to react di⁄erently to
shocks originating in di⁄erent regions, as the e⁄ect of shocks depends crucially on
the labor market structure of the region where the shock takes place.18
5.2 Does labor market ￿ exibility make macro stabilization
easier?
Flexible labor markets are believed to be important to facilitate the e¢ cient adjust-
ment of an economy to sectoral shifts and economic changes. In order to understand
to what extent this is true, Figure 6 shows the policy frontier, i.e. the best combina-
tion of in￿ ation volatility and unemployment volatility that the CB can achieve.19
A reduction in UR changes the slope of the policy frontier, which shifts outside.
Intuitively, when labor is ￿ exible, in￿ ation becomes less sensitive to labor market
conditions and the Phillips curve becomes ￿ atter. For monetary policy this implies
18See, e.g., Campolmi and Faia (2008) and Abbritti and Mueller (2009).
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Figure 6: Labor Market Rigidities and the Policy Frontier
that the central bank can only reduce in￿ ation volatility at the cost of a larger
increase in unemployment volatility. To put it in simple words, macroeconomic
stabilization is more di¢ cult in an economy with lower UR. A reduction in RWR, on
the contrary, shifts the policy frontier inside (as it reduces the trade-o⁄ of monetary
policy in face of productivity and oil shocks)20 and steepens its slope (as the Phillips
curve gets steeper). Both e⁄ects tend to reduce the costs in terms of in￿ ation and
unemployment volatilities: more ￿ exible wages make macroeconomic stabilization
much easier.21
This analysis suggests that reforms that reduce the hiring and ￿ring costs in the
labor market (which are likely to have bene￿cial e⁄ects on the natural level of un-
employment) may decrease the responsiveness of in￿ ation to unemployment, render
macroeconomic stabilization more di¢ cult and lower the e⁄ectiveness of monetary
policy on the nominal side of the economy. The opposite would hold if, by reducing
the degree of wage indexation or the generosity of the unemployment bene￿t system,
real wages become more ￿ exible. Taking into consideration these e⁄ects is likely to
be important in order to give monetary policy a role in accommodating labor market
reforms in an optimal way.
6 Empirical analysis
Our simple model provides several predictions regarding the dynamic behavior of
in￿ ation and unemployment under di⁄erent labor market structures. The approach
we choose in testing these hypothesis is twofold. In a ￿rst step, we test to which
20See Blanchard and Gal￿ (2008).
21See Abbritti and Mueller (2009) for a similar analysis in the context of a currency union model.
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and the trade-o⁄, respectively. Doing so allows us to establish whether it is useful
to divide between institutions that can be considered as RWR and those which can
be considered as UR, and to comment on the interaction of the two. In a second
step we estimate a panel VAR with interaction terms and analyze how the impulse
responses of unemployment and in￿ ation vary with the two types of labor market
institutions as a response to external oil and demand shocks. This provides a more
stringent test of the ￿rst two claims and allows us to comment on the quantitative
relevance of the two types of institutions in shaping the response of unemployment
and in￿ ation to shocks.
6.1 Associating labor market institutions
The labor market literature identi￿es an abundant amount of LMIs. In our model
this complex set of institutions is subdivided into two main groups: institutions
which cause unemployment rigidities and those which lead to real wage rigidities.
To map the theoretical predictions of the model into empirics, it is essential to
subdivide LMIs into those groups. To do so, we resort to the ￿ndings of the labor
market literature and sketch how di⁄erent institutions could be accommodated in
the context of our framework.
Institutions constraining the quantity adjustment in the labor market are hiring
costs (￿), ￿ring costs (￿) and the (in)e¢ ciency of the matching technology (￿ m).
When hiring costs and ￿ring costs are higher, or when the matching between the
workers and the ￿rms in the labor market is less e¢ cient, ￿rms ￿nd it easier and
cheaper to absorb shocks by changing prices than by changing quantities. In terms of
observable institutions, we have a reliable indicator of ￿ring costs in the employment
protection legislation index (EPL), while, unfortunately, good indicators of hiring
and ￿ring costs are missing. In the following, we will therefore refer to the EPL as
our main indicator of unemployment rigidities.
Institutions that potentially a⁄ect the degree of real wage rigidities are the
generosity of the unemployment bene￿t system, the tax wedge, the union den-
sity/coverage and the extent of coordination/centralization of the wage bargaining.22
A high bene￿t duration or generous bene￿t replacement ratios may increase the
degree of wage rigidities by raising the reservation wage (RES). When the unem-
ployment bene￿t system is very generous workers face a better outside option and
22Another institution creating real wage rigidities, which we do not consider due to lack of data,
is the degree of wage indexation (￿) and the contract length.
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argument has been formalized by Zanetti (2007) and Campolmi and Faia (2008).
However, higher generosity in the bene￿t system may also a⁄ect the search e⁄ort,
which in turn has quantity implications. It is therefore to some extent an empirical
question whether the bene￿t system is a good measures of RWRs.
The tax wedge would enter in our setup the wage equation via the reservation
wage (RES), since a higher tax wedge requires a higher compensation for a given
level of consumption. Hence, a higher tax wedge increases the fraction of the wage
that is less responsive to the labor market conditions, making the wage rate less
responsive to unemployment changes, causing real wage rigidities.
The e⁄ects of the centralization of the wage bargaining process are not clear-
cut. On the one side, proponents of the corporatist argument argue that real wages
are more responsive under centralized wage bargaining. This argument is based on
the notion that in a centralized system, unions internalize possible adverse e⁄ects
of wage increases on unemployment. On the other side, according to Calmfors and
Dri¢ ll (1988) wage setting tends to be less aggressive at the decentralized and at
the centralized level, while at intermediate levels wage settlements tend to be higher.
This gives rise to the hump-shaped hypothesis. Since most studies in the literature
￿nd stronger support for the corporatist argument,23 we start from the assumption
that a higher decentralization of wage settlement leads to more rigid wages.24
The impact of unions is not incorporated easily in our framework. Associating
union density with a higher or a lower degree of RWR depends primarily on the
unions preferences over tolerating rather variations in the real wage or variations
in the labor force. It is hence perfectly plausible that a union with high coverage
may opt for a strategy which allows for higher variations in the wage adjustment as
opposed to variations in the labor force. Given this theoretical ambiguity and the
absence of an indicator re￿ ecting union preferences, as opposed to simple coverage,
we do not include union density in our analysis.
Table 1 shows the correlations between the di⁄erent indicators and their evolution
across time. Our sample extends over 19 OECD countries for the period from 1970 to
1999. Higher levels of EPL seem to be associated with shorter bene￿t duration (BD)
and negatively correlated with more decentralized wage setting (DEC), but there is
23See for example Bertola et al. (2002), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell et al. (2001).
24To the extent that the centralization index is a proxy of the workers￿bargaining power, a higher
degree of centralization is associated with a higher ￿ in the model and thus associated with more
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(BRR). It is worth noting that the bene￿t replacement ratio and to some extent
the overall bene￿t measure (BEN) show an increasingly positive correlation with
EPL throughout time, re￿ ecting the trend in an increase in the respective bene￿t
measures across time, while EPL has been more stable.
EPL
70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99
BEN 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.19 0.24 0.28
BRR 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.27 0.36 0.40
BD -0.21 -0.25 -0.25 -0.22 -0.21 -0.23
TAX 0.13 0.23 0.28 0.42 0.34 0.19
DEC -0.30 -0.36 -0.68 -0.54 -0.57 -0.56
Table 1: Correlation across LMIs
6.2 Regression approach for volatility
As a ￿rst test we estimate directly the relationship between labor market institu-
tions and the volatilities of in￿ ation, the unemployment rate and the trade-o⁄, re-
spectively.25 In line with the simulations, the volatility is measured by the standard
deviation of the HP ￿ltered cyclical component from its trend using quarterly data.
The volatility measure is computed for 6 non-overlapping 5-year periods, roughly
equivalent to the average length of the business cycle. This procedure results in a
panel with potentially 112 observations.26 Our baseline regression is given by:
ln￿i;t = ￿1URi;t + ￿2RWRi;t + ￿Xi;t + "i;t (12)
where ln￿i;t stands for the log of the standard deviation of the respective dependent
variable, URi;t for the measure of unemployment rigidities (EPL) and RWRi;t for
the respective potential measures of real wage rigidity. Xi;t is a vector of controls
25Three studies have addressed the role of labor market institutions for the dynamics of macroeco-
nomic variables. Bowdler and Nunziata (2007) ￿nd that countries with higher centralization tend
to exhibit a dampened response of in￿ ation to certain macroeconomic shocks. Rumler and Scharler
(2009) ￿nd that in￿ ation and output volatility tend to be lower in countries with more centralized
wage bargaining. Merkl and Schmitz (2009) study the e⁄ect of labor turnover costs and bene￿t
replacement rates on in￿ ation and output volatilities during the Eurozone period (1999-2008) in
11 Euro area countries. They argue that labor market institutions matter for output volatility but
not for in￿ ation volatilities.
26We exclude Germany and Finland during the early 90s due to the extraordinary size of the
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monetary policy stance proxied by the average real interest rate level (R). Taking
the standard deviation of the unemployment rate as dependent variable, we expect
￿1 < 0 and ￿2 > 0. For the standard deviation of the in￿ ation rate and the trade-
o⁄ (the ratio of the std. dev. of in￿ ation over the std. dev. of unemployment)
we expect the signs to be exactly opposite. Labor market variables are scaled such
that coe¢ cient estimates are interpretable as the percentage change in the standard
deviation of the respective dependent variable as a response to a one unit change
in the independent variable.27 The coe¢ cient on the monetary policy stance is the
semi-elasticity of the standard deviation with respect to a 10bp increase in the real
interest rate.
The regression estimates A1-A5 in Table 2 show the results when regressing the
volatility of unemployment on the LMIs. EPL has always the right sign and it is
signi￿cantly negative when using all measures of real wage rigidity but the bene￿t
duration measure. The point estimates are in all but one of the signi￿cant cases very
similar and imply that an increase in EPL by one standard deviation results in a
reduction in unemployment volatility by roughly 10%. All potential RWR measures
have the right sign and are signi￿cant. The coe¢ cients imply that an increase in
their value by one standard deviation increases the volatility of unemployment by
12-16%. The real interest rate appears to have no consistently signi￿cant impact on
the volatility of the unemployment rate while an increase in the volatility of GDP by
1% tends to be associated with an average increase in the volatility of unemployment
by 0.3-0.45%.
The estimates for in￿ ation (B1-B5) yield in four out of ￿ve cases a signi￿cantly
positive impact of EPL on the volatility of in￿ ation, in line with the predictions of our
model. The magnitude implies that an increase by one standard deviation increases
in￿ ation volatility by a moderate 5-6%. The potential RWR measures appear to be
correctly signed and signi￿cant only when we use the overall bene￿t measure and the
tax wedge. The coe¢ cients which have the expected sign imply a reduction in the
volatility of in￿ ation by close to 8%. The volatility of output is always signi￿cant
and implies a positive link between the two. The real interest rate appears now also
in most regressions highly signi￿cant, implying that an increase by 100bp reduces
the volatility of in￿ ation by 6-8%.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working Paper Series No 1183
April 2010!A?MJ=  2'&+%4'&  0-#4+-+49 2#&'0>  0-#4+-+49 0&'-
!GJ L@= NGD9LADALQ LJ9<=
GZ 
	 GMJ E=9KMJ= G> 0- =FL=JK 9DD J=?J=KKAGFK
KA?FAS;9FLDQ 9F< ;GJJ=;LDQ KA?F=< /@= =KLAE9L=< AEH9;L G> 9F AF;J=9K= AF  +' :Q
GF= KL9F<9J< <=NA9LAGF J9F?=K :=LO==F 
 DD HGL=FLA9D -2- E=9KMJ=K @9N=
L@= =PH=;L=< F=?9LAN= KA?F 9F< 9J= KA?FAS;9FL /@= ;G=Y;A=FLK GF -- 9F<  )
AEHDQ L@9L 9F AF;J=9K= AF GF= KL9F<9J< <=NA9LAGF :Q L@= J=KH=;LAN= E=9KMJ= D=9<K LG
9 >9DD AF L@= LJ9<=
GZ :Q 	 O@AD= 9F AF;J=9K= AF L@= :=F=SL <MJ9LAGF QA=D<K9D G O = J
=KLAE9L= 

/@MK AL 9HH=9JK L@9L AF H9JLA;MD9J L@= ?=F=JGKALQ G> L@= MF=EHDGQE=FL :=F=SL
KQKL=E 9F< L@= L9P O=<?= 9J= J=9KGF9:D= E=9KMJ=K G> -2-	 KAF;= L@=Q ;GFKLJ9AF L@=
9<BMKLE=FL G> HJA;=K /G ?=L 9 :=LL=J A<=9 9:GML L@AK DAFC AF L=JEK G> IM9FLAL9LAN=
AEHDA;9LAGFK	 O= J=HJ=K=FL ?J9H@A;9DDQ L@= HJ=<A;L=< N9DM=K >GJ L@= NGD9LADALQ LJ9<=
GZ
MKAF? L@= ;GEHGKAL= :=F=SL E=9KMJ=  ) 9K HJGPQ >GJ -2-	 A= J=?J=KKAGF 
/@= K@9H= ?=LK N=JQ ;DGK= LG L@= GF= HJ=<A;L=< :Q GMJ KAEHD= EG<=D AF L=JEK G>
GJ<=JAF? 9F< E9?FALM<=
/@= GN=J9DD '9 >GJ L@=K= L@J== J=?J=KKAGF ?JGMHK AF<A;9L= L@9L L@= =KLAE9LAGF
=IM9LAGF =PHD9AFK 9:GML  G> L@= N9JA9LAGF AF L@= NGD9LADALQ G> L@= MF=EHDGQE=FL
J9L= 9F< 
 >GJ :GL@ L@= AFT9LAGF J9L= 9F< L@= NGD9LADALQ LJ9<=
GZ 2= H=J>GJE
9 K=JA=K G> JG:MKLF=KK ;@=;CK	 <JGHHAF? L@= ;GFLJGDK	 ;GFKA<=JAF? HGGD=< =KLAE9LGJK	
-=?J=KKAF? L@= J9LAG GF L@= '($K AK FGL GFDQ ;GF;=HLM9DDQ 9F 9HH=9DAF? ;GF;=HL :ML 9NGA<K 9DKG
L@= HJG:D=E G> =F<G?=F=ALQ L@9L E9Q =PAKL O@=F O= L@AFC G> AFT9LAGF 9F< MF=EHDGQE=FL NGD9LADALQ
:=AF? AFTM=F;=< :Q =9;@ GL@=J 2@AD= -MED=J 9F< .;@9JD=J 

 =KLAE9L= 9 KQKL=E G> AFT9LAGF




Working Paper Series No 1183
April 2010introducing country ￿xed e⁄ects and allowing for direct interaction terms between
RWR and UR by replacing ￿2RWRi;t with ￿2URi;t￿RWRi;t (Results are available on
request and are not reported to save space). The major ￿ndings may be summarized
by the following three points: First, labor market institutions account for about
half of the share in the R2 in the unemployment equation and the volatility trade-
o⁄ equation but only for about a fourth in the in￿ ation equation. Second, on a
cross country basis, labor market institutions are more relevant for unemployment
dynamics, while on a within basis, they appear to be more relevant for in￿ ation
dynamics. In the in￿ ation regressions with country ￿xed e⁄ects, the coe¢ cients on
the LMIs are in four out of ￿ve regressions signi￿cant and correctly signed, explaining
up to 20% in the variation across time of in￿ ation volatility. Third, employing
interaction terms increases the level of signi￿cance of most coe¢ cients but leaves the
explanatory power of the model unchanged.
6.3 Regression approach for dynamic responses
The preceding analysis - while being supportive to our model￿ s predictions - leaves
one aspect unaddressed: it neglects potential di⁄erences in the underlying shocks
that countries face. Our second test goes one step further. We analyze the dynamics
of in￿ ation and unemployment using a panel VAR approach and allow the coe¢ cient
estimates to vary with the characteristics of the labor market.29 This allows us not
only to control for the magnitude of the shocks within an economy but also to analyze
the di⁄erential response to shocks under di⁄erent degrees of labor market rigidities
and evaluate their quantitative implications for the transmission to in￿ ation and
unemployment dynamics. We estimate the following panel VAR:
A0Yi;t = ￿i +
L X
l=1
AlYi;t￿l + "i;t (13)
where Yi;t =
￿
Sit; Uit; INFLit; INTit
￿0
, "i;t are the structural shocks and ￿i
are a set of country ￿xed e⁄ects. Sit stands for a set of exogenous shocks, Uit for
the unemployment rate, INFLit for the in￿ ation rate and INTit for the nominal
interest rate. We consider two exogenous external shocks, an oil price shock and an
external demand shock (which we proxy by the real growth rate of imports in the
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Conventional wisdom holds that more ￿ exibility in the labor market implies neces-
sarily more e¢ cient adjustment and thus is always preferable. The present paper
argues that such a view starts from the misperception that the labor market may be
reduced to a single dimension. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that la-
bor market institutions should at least be divided in two categories: the institutions
that constrain the ￿ ows in and out of unemployment (which we have referred to as
unemployment rigidities, UR) and the institutions that restrain the responsiveness
of wages to shocks (real wage rigidities, RWR). This distinction is important, be-
cause the two types of labor market institutions are found to have opposite e⁄ects
on the business cycle: while a higher degree of UR increase in￿ ation volatility and
reduce unemployment volatility, more rigid wages reduce the volatility of nominal
variables and increase the response of the real economy. In the empirical part, we
have proposed a classi￿cation of the labor market institutions into these two groups
and we have shown that this simple intuition works well.
Second, we argue that analyzing one institution in isolation of the other may be
misleading due to important interactions among the di⁄erent labor market institu-
tions. In particular, it is crucial to determine whether institutions are complements
or substitutes: the e⁄ects of RWR and UR on the slope of the Phillips curve tend to
o⁄set each other when the two types of rigidities are complements (in the sense that
high RWR are associated with high UR, or vice versa) while they tend to reinforce
and magnify each other when they are substitutes (in the sense that countries with
rigid labor have ￿ exible real wages or vice versa). The distinction is crucial since
it implies that the dynamics of a country that has rigid labor and rigid wages may
be very similar to the dynamics of a country that has relatively ￿ exible wages and
unemployment ￿ ows. Indeed, we believe that the success of our empirical part in
detecting the e⁄ect of di⁄erent institutions on in￿ ation and unemployment dynamics
follows from the fact that we have explicitly taken the existence of these interaction
e⁄ects into account.
Third, estimating a panel VAR with interaction terms, we have shown that the
response of in￿ ation and unemployment to oil price, monetary policy and external
demand shocks is signi￿cantly di⁄erent across countries with di⁄erent labor market
institutions. Labor market institutions thus appear to be important not only for
unemployment dynamics, but also for in￿ ation dynamics.
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A Data appendix
Data come from various sources. Macroeconomic data comes from the OECD￿ s Eco-
nomic Outlook.38 Most labor market indicators are taken from Nickel et al. (2001).
In particular the bene￿t replacement rate, the bene￿t duration, the tax wedge and
the union density measures are from Nickel. The measure for the coordination of
wage setting is taken from Kenworthy (2001).39 The qualitative implication of using
the coordination measures by Nickel et al. (2001) are unchanged. In both cases,
38Since no real imports in GDP PPP values are available for Germany before 1990, we used the
growth rate of real imports to write the values backwards. The measure does not include Austria￿ s
imports since no quarterly data is available.
39The variable is not available for Portugal and Spain.
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UR INFL T.o⁄ EPL BEN BRR BD TAX DEC UND
Anglo
Austral. 0.81 0.76 0.94 5.0 23.2 23.0 10.2 36.3 3.00 46.6
UK 0.71 1.15 1.63 3.4 21.0 28.1 6.5 47.5 4.30 49.7
USA 0.77 0.52 0.67 1.0 12.6 27.7 1.8 43.3 4.73 20.8
Skand.
Denmk. 0.66 0.75 1.12 10.0 50.0 59.8 7.5 57.1 2.00 73.8
Norway 0.46 0.68 1.50 15.0 28.2 45.4 4.6 61.9 1.23 54.0
Sweden 0.59 0.87 1.48 14.3 23.7 60.8 4.0 72.8 1.83 79.6
Cont. Eur.
France 0.41 0.44 1.07 12.8 31.7 57.6 3.6 63.2 4.00 16.2
Italy 0.43 0.79 1.85 19.1 6.32 10.1 0.6 58.8 3.23 43.6
Spain 1.02 0.82 0.80 18.3 28.2 64.8 1.7 37.1 na 11.9
B Empirical Volatility of In￿ ation and Unemploy-
ment
The following two graphs report the in￿ ation and unemployment volatility as a func-
tion of the two types of labor market institutions. Values are computed simulating
the economies under di⁄erent types of labor market constellations holding the dis-
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